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Abstract 
Where does the cognitive system begin and end? 
Intracranialists (such as Rupert, Adams, and Aizawa) maintain 
that the cognitive system is entirely identifiable with the 
biological central nervous system (CNS). Transcranialists (such 
as Clark and Chalmers), on the other hand, suggest that the 
cognitive system can extend beyond the biological CNS. In the 
second division of Supersizing the Mind, Clark defends the 
transcranial account against various objections. Of interest for 
this paper is Clark’s response to what he calls “asymmetry 
arguments.” Asymmetry arguments can be summarized as 
follows: subtract the props and aids, and the organism may 
create replacements. But subtract the organism, and all 
cognitive activity ceases. Although I am sympathetic to Clark’s 
overall project, I find his response to the asymmetry arguments 
inadequate in light of his responses to other objections. For this 
reason, I maintain that Clark’s response requires revision. By 
adopting a process metaphysics and appealing to mereological 
dependencies, I believe that Clark can provide a substantive 
response to asymmetry arguments that is consistent with his 
overall theory. This paper unfolds as follows: after 
summarizing Clark’s response to the asymmetry objection in 
(§2), I will argue that his response is unsuccessful in (§3). My 
argument hinges on the claim that Clark does not take into 
account the full intent of Rupert’s asymmetry argument. In (§4) 
I modify Clark’s response by appealing to mereology and the 
asymmetrical dependencies found therein. I conclude in (§5) 
that this modification provides Clark with an adequate response 
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to the asymmetry argument and is consistent with his overall 
transcranialist account. The further question of whether this 
account assists Clark in responding to other intracranialist 
objections is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
here does the cognitive system begin and end? 
Intracranialists (such as Rupert, Adams, and 
Aizawa) maintain that the cognitive system is entirely 
identifiable with the biological central nervous system 
(CNS). Transcranialists (such as Clark and Chalmers), on the 
other hand, suggest that the cognitive system can extend 
beyond the biological CNS.i 
 
In the second division of Supersizing the Mind, Clark 
defends the transcranial account against various objections. 
Of interest for this paper is Clark’s response to what he calls 
“asymmetry arguments” (Clark 2008). ii Asymmetry 
arguments can be summarized as follows: “subtract the 
props and aids, and the organism may create replacements. 
But subtract the organism, and all cognitive activity ceases” 
(Clark 2008, 162). Although I am sympathetic to Clark’s 
overall project, I find his response to the asymmetry 
arguments inadequate in light of his responses to other 
objections. For this reason, I maintain that Clark’s response 
requires revision. By adopting a process metaphysics and 
appealing to mereological dependencies, I believe that Clark 
W 
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can provide a substantive response to asymmetry arguments 
that is consistent with his overall theory. 
 
This paper unfolds as follows: after summarizing Clark’s 
response to the asymmetry objection in (§2), I will argue that 
his response is unsuccessful in (§3). My argument hinges on 
the claim that Clark does not take into account the full intent 
of Rupert’s asymmetry argument. In (§4) I modify Clark’s 
response by appealing to mereology and the asymmetrical 
dependencies found therein. I conclude in (§5) that this 
modification provides Clark with an adequate response to 
the asymmetry argument and is consistent with his overall 
transcranialist account. The further question of whether this 
account assists Clark in responding to other intracranialist 
objections is beyond the scope of this paper.iii 
 
2. CLARK’S ASYMMETRY ARGUMENT 
 
Clark’s formulation of the asymmetry argument can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
If an organism loses its external props or aids, 
then it is possible to sustain cognitive activity 
by replacing those props and aids. On the 
other hand, if an organism ceases to exist, 
then cognitive activity will not be sustained 
among the props that are external to the 
organism (Clark 2008, 162).  
 
The asymmetry argument is taken to criticize the extended 
mind thesis by suggesting that there is something significant 
about the organism distinct from external objects that are 
taken to be part of the cognitive system. If it were the case 
that the external objects had the role in the cognitive system 
that extended mind theorists take those objects to have, then 
it seems that we would not observe such distinctions among 
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the cognitive system’s constituent parts. But we do observe 
this asymmetry. Therefore, by modus tollens, it is not the 
case that external objects have the role in the cognitive 
system that extended mind theorists take those objects to 
have. For example, as in the case of the now famous Otto 
(see Clark and Chalmers 1998), who suffers from 
Alzheimer’s and is dependent upon his notebook for 
remembering the location of the Museum of Modern Art, if 
Otto’s notebook is damaged or lost, it seems that we can 
repair or replace the notebook and its contents without 
altering the cognitive system that consists of Otto and the 
notebook. If the biological Otto, on the other hand, is 
damaged or lost, then it does not appear that the cognitive 
system will remain unaltered—or even continue to exist. 
 
2.1. CLARK’S RESPONSE 
 
Clark rejects the initial conditional of the above modus 
tollens by agreeing that we do observe asymmetrical 
relations between the human brain and the objects external 
to the organism. When we subtract “those meaty islands of 
wet organismic plasticity, the whole [cognitive] process 
grinds to a standstill” (Clark 2008, 162). Elsewhere, though, 
Clark makes a similar move by suggesting that other 
objections to the transcranialist (e.g., boundary issues) are 
not really objections (Clark 2008). In those other instances 
he shows how the objection is not an objection by fleshing 
out his description of the transcranialist conception of the 
cognitive system. Clark, however, does not provide a precise 
account of the “lopsidedly essential” nature of the brain in 
this case. Instead, he provides examples to motivate the 
intuition that since there are things which are essentially 
lopsided in an analogous fashion to the brain in its 
relationship to external objects, we should not reject the 
extended mind thesis out-of-hand. Before identifying the 
problems with this approach, it is helpful to first summarize 
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the examples he provides and the example that I believe best 
represents Clark’s response to the asymmetry argument. 
 
2.1.1. INFLATING INTUITIONS 
 
Clark first considers the relationship between a person and a 
marker. Similar to Otto and his notebook, we should not 
believe that the marker is cognitive or is the cognitive system 
once the person ceases to exist or use the marker.iv Clark 
then provides an analogy suggesting that the cognitive 
system is lopsidedly dependent on the brain in a similar way 
to how a finger is dependent on a person’s body. This 
analogy illustrates how some things are asymmetrically 
dependent upon one another—the organism can exist 
without a finger, but the finger cannot exist unaltered 
independently of the organism. Lastly, he evokes Chalmers’ 
example, “Subtract the visual cortex and I can survive and 
attempt to compensate in various ways. But do whatever it 
takes to subtract me, and the leftover visual cortex won’t try 
any such maneuvers” (Clark 2008, 162).  
 
Because I do not wish to address the murky concept of me-
ness, or a purely intracranial phenomenon, I will not be 
discussing any further Chalmers’ example. Furthermore, the 
example of the pen’s relationship to a person begs the 
question as to whether external objects can ever be proper 
parts of a cognitive system. I find Clark’s reference to the 
finger’s dependency on an organism’s body to be the most 
useful because it makes use of something that we can agree 
is asymmetrically dependent (i.e., what it is for something to 
be a finger is for it to be a member of a hand). For this reason, 
I will focus on Clark’s analogy of the finger’s dependency 
on an organism’s body for the remainder of this paper.  
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2.1.2. THE FINGER AND THE BODY 
 
The removal of a finger will modify the organism that it is 
part of, but not prevent the organism from functioning as 
such, whereas the removal of everything but the finger will 
not allow the finger to function as a finger.v In other words, 
the body is lopsidedly essential for the existence of the 
organism-finger relation. This analogy highlights the 
asymmetrical relationship among the members of a system. 
The removal of some parts of a system may simply modify 
a system. Some parts, though, may nullify a system 
altogether upon their removal—that is, some component 
parts may be necessary for the existence of a system.  
 
Clark appears to treat this analogy as an adequate response 
to the asymmetry argument. By showing that there is at least 
one thing that is asymmetrically dependent, he implies that 
we have reasons for believing that the asymmetry argument 
does not pose a problem for the transcranial account. I do 
agree that asymmetrical dependence will play a significant 
role in responding to the asymmetry argument, but I believe 
that the asymmetrical relation of a finger and the body does 
not serve this function.   
 
3. UNSUCCESSFULNESS OF CLARK’S ANALOGY 
 
I believe that Clark’s initial response to the asymmetry 
argument is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, it does not 
provide adequate reason for dismissing the asymmetry 
argument. This is due to Clark’s analogy not addressing the 
problem expressed by the asymmetry argument. Second, 
Clark’s response does not give us reason for preferring the 
transcranial to a specific interpretation of the intracranial 
account. This follows from Clark’s failure to take into 
account the full aim of Rupert’s asymmetry argument. After 
discussing why his response is unsuccessful in dealing with 
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his initial formulation of the asymmetry argument, I will 
consider Clark’s response in light of a formulation of the 
asymmetry argument that is aligned more closely to Rupert’s 
original intentions. 
 
3.1. CLARK’S FORMULATION 
 
The main thrust of the asymmetry argument is that the 
transcranialist cannot account for the significance of the 
biological organism in the cognitive system. First, although 
Clark does this elsewhere (Clark 2008, 139), his analogy 
does not directly motivate the significance of the organism 
in the cognitive system. Instead, his analogy gestures to how 
a part of a human may be dependent upon the core organism 
to a greater extent than the organism is dependent on the part. 
This gesture, however, does not provide us with any reason 
for believing that objects which are external to the organism 
are part of the cognitive system. We have good reasons for 
believing that the finger is part of the organism’s body 
because we can directly observe how the finger is connected 
to the body. We cannot do the same for objects that we claim 
are part of the cognitive system. At the most we can observe 
when the causal systems underlying cognitive systems are 
disrupted, but this is not the same as directly observing the 
parts of the cognitive system itself—partly because we are 
unable to make observable distinctions between the 
cognitive system itself and behaviors that the organism 
exhibits that indicate that cognitive activity is occurring.  
 
Second, the relationship between an organism and the 
objects of the external environment that make up an 
extended cognitive system is disanalogous to the 
relationship between a finger and the rest of the body. 
Transcranialists maintain that when the cognitive system is 
extended beyond the brain and CNS, it functions by means 
of an organism interacting (coupled) with objects in the 
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environment. But the cognitive system, itself, is not only the 
organism plus the objects in the environment. To identify a 
cognitive system as such, there must be cognitive activity 
occurring—that is, the component parts that make up the 
cognitive system must be interacting with each other in a 
particular way (although what this way is is a contentious 
matter). The finger’s membership to a body, on the other 
hand, does not require any activity (as in the case of a corpse) 
for the finger to be part of a body.  
 
To summarize, Clark’s analogy fails for two reasons. First, 
the analogy fails to motivate the centrality of the organism 
in the cognitive system by not providing us with enough 
information to identify the structure of the cognitive system. 
Second, the relationship between a finger and the body 
requires a different set of conditions for their existence than 
the set of conditions that the cognitive system requires. It 
appears, then, that Clark’s analogy does not motivate the 
essentialness of the brain or the CNS for the existence of the 
cognitive system, and, therefore, is unsuccessful in refuting 
his own formulation of the asymmetry argument. 
 
3.1.1. INITIAL WORRIES 
 
At this point in the discussion, someone might object that I 
am simply attacking Clark’s analogy. Clark’s analogy, 
though, is all that he offers as a response to the asymmetry 
argument. In particular, Clark offers the analogy as an 
intuition pump to have us think that the cognitive system is 
lopsidedly dependent upon the brain and CNS. He writes, 
“The arguments from lopsidedness gain a thin veneer of 
persuasiveness only because we are unused to thinking of 
our brains as themselves not one single indivisible unity … 
but simply as another collection of mechanisms” (Clark 
2008, 163 emphasis in original). As stated above, this is a 
mistaken understanding of the charge of the asymmetry 
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argument. I agree that many of us are unused to thinking of 
the cognitive system as a collection of mechanisms, but for 
Clark’s analogy to successfully fend off the asymmetry 
objection, he needs to provide an argument that highlights 
the nature of the cognitive system—not only modify the way 
that we think about it. So, although it does appear that I am 
only attacking Clark’s analogy, it is all that he offers us. 
Things appear to only get worse for the transcranialist when 
we consider how Clark’s formulation of the asymmetry 
argument does not capture the full force of Rupert’s 
objection, which I consider in the next section. 
 
3.2. RUPERT’S FORMULATION 
 
In many places, Rupert (2010, 2010a, 2009, 2009a, 2009b, 
2004) expresses the worry that we should not rush to endorse 
the extended mind thesis because “Acceptance of the 
[hypothesis of extended cognition] would alter our approach 
to research and theorizing in cognitive science and, it would 
seem, significantly change our conception of persons” 
(Rupert 2004, 389). Before endorsing the extended mind 
thesis, Rupert suggests that we should check to see if there 
are any competing views. If it turns out that more than one 
theory explains the same phenomenon, we ought to endorse 
the more conservative theory (Rupert 2009). In the case of 
the extended mind debate, Rupert prefers the competing 
view of embedded cognition. This is the view that “typical 
cognitive processes depend, in surprising and complex ways, 
on the organism’s use of external resources, but cognition 
does not literally extend into the environment” (Rupert 2009, 
5). Because the embedded cognition view is capable of 
explaining the same phenomena as the extended view 
“within a more conservative framework,” Rupert maintains 
that we do not have adequate reasons at the moment for 
adopting the extended view of cognition (Rupert 2004, 390). 
It seems, then, that the burden of proof is upon the 
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transcranialist to provide reasons for why we should prefer 
the extended account over the embedded view. 
 
In the case of the asymmetry argument, proponents of the 
extended mind view can accommodate the asymmetry by 
providing an account of the essentialness of the organism (as 
Clark does (Clark 2008, 195)). The embedded mind theorist 
also believes that the organism is essential to the cognitive 
system, and is, therefore, also capable of accounting for the 
asymmetry relation between the organism and the objects in 
the external environment. The difference, though, is that the 
embedded cognition theorist is able to account for this 
asymmetry by not allowing objects in the external 
environment to be members of the cognitive system—
thereby not needing to explain how the cognitive system 
expands beyond the brain and CNS. Presuming that we 
ought to adopt theories that maintain the fine balance of 
simplicity and explanatory power,vi Rupert believes that we 
have more reasons for adopting the embedded cognitive 
view than the extended cognitive view (Rupert 2009 and 
2004). 
 
Rather than asking the transcranialist to provide an account 
of how the cognitive system is lopsidedly dependent, the 
above formulation asks us to provide an account of why we 
should prefer the transcranialist picture to the intracranial 
one given the asymmetry of the cognitive system. I will now 
consider how Clark’s analogy unsuccessfully responds to 
this formulation. 
 
3.2.1. ANALOGY IS UNSUCCESSFUL  
 
To be successful in responding to Rupert’s formulation of 
the asymmetry argument, Clark’s analogy must provide us 
with adequate reasons for preferring the extended view to the 
embedded view in light of the existence of cognitive 
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lopsidedness. His analogy, however, is unsuccessful in this 
regard for similar reasons to why his analogy fails to rebut 
his own formulation of the asymmetry argument. First, the 
methods used for identifying the relationship between a 
finger and a body are inadequate for identifying the 
relationships of the component parts of any cognitive 
system. This suggests that the observational methods 
employed to identify biological part-whole relations 
underdetermine both the extended and embedded views. In 
other words, both theories of extended and embedded 
cognition are equally consistent with the data obtained by 
current observational methods. So, although Clark’s analogy 
does not succeed in providing reasons for preferring the 
extended view of cognition to the embedded view, the 
analogy illustrates that in at least one regard both extended 
and embedded cognition theories fall together.  
 
Second, although Clark admits that the analogy is a non-
cognitive example (Clark 2008, 162), the analogy seems to 
favor the embedded view. By highlighting the extent to 
which the biological organism is asymmetrically dependent 
upon its own constituent parts (e.g., fingers are dependent 
upon hands, but hands are not dependent upon fingers), the 
analogy provides us with reasons for believing that the 
material body  is an essential part of any biological system, 
one of which happens to be the cognitive system, but we are 
left with no reason for believing that the cognitive system 
itself is dependent upon objects that are external to the 
material body.  
 
Given such considerations, Clark’s analogy does not provide 
us with a reason for preferring the extended mind thesis to 
the embedded account, and, therefore, is not an adequate 
response to Rupert’s formulation of the asymmetry 
argument. So, although Clark does not appear to offer an 
adequate response to the asymmetry argument in the two 
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above formulations, I do not believe that Clark’s account is 
flawed beyond redemption. It is possible for Clark to offer a 
response to the asymmetry argument that highlights the 
structure of the cognitive system while also giving us 
reasons to prefer the extended mind thesis to the embedded 
account. The next section will suggest how this might be 
done.  
 
4. MEREOLOGICAL ASYMMETRIES 
 
There is much contention as to what kind of thing the 
cognitive system is. The main competing views appear to fall 
neatly along the intracranial and transcranial lines. I believe 
that clarifying the metaphysical presuppositions that 
underlie these opposing views will help Clark provide an 
adequate response to the asymmetry argument.  
 
4.1. FROM SUBSTANCE TO PROCESS 
 
Those who think of the cognitive system in intracranalist 
terms seek to identify where the cognitive system begins and 
ends. By identifying the parts of the cognitive system and 
locating the boundaries of those parts, they believe that they 
can identify the boundaries of the cognitive system itself 
(Adams and Aizawa 2010). Because cognitive science 
suggests that the cognitive system is bound to the organism, 
the intracranialist  interpretation does not lend itself to the 
view that the cognitive system extends beyond the organism 
(Menary 2010). I believe that this is an outcome of the 
intracranialists maintaining a substance-based ontology, 
which suggests that substances are the only ontological 
primitives.vii By presuming that all that exists are substances, 
intracranialists do not allow room to for cognitive elements 
to extend beyond the substances upon which they are taken 
to depend. 
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A process-based ontology tells a different story of what the 
underlying components consist of. In this story, processes, 
rather than substances, play the foundational role. This is 
amiable to the transcranialist view of mind—the view that 
the cognitive system is a set of mental process. The 
transcranialist story suggests that the cognitive system is not 
simply a conglomerate of stuff, but that it is by the 
component parts of the cognitive system being arranged in a 
particular way that allows them to interact with each other. 
By interacting in the appropriate way, the cognitive system 
is sustained over time.  
 
The outcome of understanding what is doing the interacting 
will determine how the cognitive system can change, thereby 
determining to what extent it is bound by the biological 
organism. On the substance-based view, if it is only 
substances that make up the constituent parts of the cognitive 
system, then it is certainly difficult to understand how the 
cognitive system is not strictly bound to the biological 
organism. The process-based ontologist, on the other hand, 
by viewing the constituent parts of the system as processes, 
has room to incorporate external objects within the cognitive 
system.  
 
To understand what the constituent parts of the cognitive 
system are, we need to clarify what it means for something 
to be dependent upon something else. As in the case of many 
ontologically dependent objects (e.g., smiles, holes, fists, 
and paths), the existence of an object A may depend upon the 
existence of an object B, but B might not depend upon A—
that is, the relationship may be asymmetrical. The direction 
of the asymmetry can be evaluated counterfactually. Given 
the above asymmetry, if B were to cease to exist, then A 
would also cease to exist. But if A were to cease to exist, then 
B would not cease to exist. For example, a smile is a 
disturbance on a face that is asymmetrically dependent upon 
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the face that is smiling (Simons 1987, 306-8). If it were the 
case that the face did not exist, then the smile would also not 
exist.viii On the other hand, if the smile ceased to exist, the 
face would not go out of existence by virtue of the absence 
of the smile.  
 
This discussion of mereology highlights how some objects 
depend upon the structure of substances, and appears to be 
the approach that most cognitive theorists have taken to 
understand the cognitive system. In particular, the 
substances that the cognitive system depends upon are 
evaluated in terms of their causal role in producing cognitive 
effects. To produce a cognitive effect once, though, is not 
sufficient on the intracranialist view for something to be part 
of the cognitive system. The part must also regularly 
generate cognitive states in a predictable fashion as 
determined by cognitive science and psychology (Menary 
2010, 18).  
 
Cognitive science and psychology are also responsible for 
determining what kind of things the parts of the cognitive 
system must be. It is helpful to think about a smile again. A 
smile is not identical to the process of smiling, although the 
smile is the result of a face being disturbed in a specific way.  
Similarly, intracranialists maintain that engaging in a 
cognitive process such as remembering is distinct from the 
memory itself. So even if it is the case that a memory is 
offloaded to an external device (as in the case of Otto’s 
notebook), the act of remembering is radically different from 
the locating of a memory on an external device. These 
processes of locating a memory from an external device and 
the act of remembering are described by cognitive scientists 
and psychologists in different terms, and, as Rupert states, 
“the external portions of extended ‘memory’ states 
(processes) differ so greatly from internal memories (the 
process of remembering) that they should be treated as 
Cognitive Processes and Asymmetrical Dependencies | Winters 
 
22 
 
distinct kinds” (Rupert 2004, 407 quoted in Menary 2010, 
18).  
 
Intracranialists, however, are likely to only follow guidelines 
offered by cognitive science and psychology to identify parts 
of the cognitive system. These fields only identify properties 
that exist within the organism as being candidate members 
of the cognitive system. As Menary indicates, “Mental 
properties are dependent on neuronal properties in an 
especially clear way; therefore the brain instantiates mental 
properties” (Menary 2010, 14). This approach is motivated 
by a substance-based metaphysics. What would happen, 
though, to the cognitive story if we shift to a process-based 
view?  
 
The shift to a process-based view is not a novel maneuver. 
McTaggart, Russell, Whitehead, Carnap, and Quine, 
although in different forms and for different reasons, all 
endorsed process-based views at one time or another 
(Simons 1987, 123 n.43). Once we shift to a process-based 
ontology there is no obvious reason why dependency 
relations would disappear. Furthermore, there does not seem 
to be any reason why there would not be asymmetrical 
dependencies. But since processes would be the basic 
constituents, rather than substances, and most of us think in 
substance terms with our privileging of noun-phrases, we 
need to offer an account of how processes can be 
asymmetrically dependent upon one another.  
 
It is important to first note that processes are four-
dimensional entities. Processes require temporal parts 
because a process is something that occurs over time insofar 
as it begins and ends (Sider 2001, 211). In addition to having 
temporal parts, according to Seibt (2003, 31-32), a process 
is an activity that is a mode of occurrence that fulfills four 
conditions: 
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(1) Activities are always completed once 
going on. From ‘person S is doing activity A’ 
we can infer that ‘S has done A’. For example, 
a person who is swimming can be said to 
have swam.  
(2) Activities can be suspended and 
resumed. From ‘S having done A’ we cannot 
infer that ‘S is still doing A’ or that ‘S is no 
longer doing A’. To say that a person has 
swam, though, does not allow us to infer that 
she is either still swimming or is no longer 
swimming.  
(3) Can recur. From ‘S does A’ we can 
infer that there are many instances of S doing 
A. If a person swims, then we can infer that 
there are many instances of the person 
swimming.  
(4) Any present going on of an activity is 
the outcome of its past going on. From ‘S 
doing A’ we can infer that ‘S has been doing 
A’. For a person to be currently swimming, 
we can infer that she has been swimming.   
 
From the four above conditions and the idea of temporal 
parts, we are able to determine when a process starts and 
ends. We still have the difficult task of establishing the 
spatial boundaries of a process. For example, during the time 
that a person performs the act of swimming, we can use a 
measuring device (e.g., a watch) to determine when the 
activity starts and ends. But where does the swimming 
actually take place? We can better understand the boundaries 
of a process by understanding how a process is dependent 
upon its temporal and spatial parts. 
 
Siebt (2003, 32) outlines two types of relations that can be 
obtained between a process and its parts: 
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Likepartedness: An entity of kind K is 
likeparted iff some of its spatial or temporal 
parts are of kind K.  
Strict likepartedness: An entity of kind K is 
likeparted iff all of its spatial or temporal 
parts are of kind K.  
 
Presuming that processes are entities, we can use these 
relations to better understand the boundaries of an activity 
such as swimming. Strict likepartedness implies that in the 
event of swimming, every part of the swimming is itself a 
swimming. But this seems obviously false. Water is not a 
swimming, a swimming cap is not a swimming, a time slice 
at which swimming occurs is itself not a swimming, and so 
on. Swimming is a process that undergoes changes. For a 
process to undergo change requires that the process lose and 
gain parts. So it is plausible to believe that not all parts of the 
act of swimming are all engaged in swimming at each 
moment that swimming occurs.  
 
When a hand dips into the water at the same time that the 
feet propel the body forward, the hand, water, feet, and body 
are exhibiting swimming-like attributes. But the water that 
the person is not swimming through and the parts of the body 
that are not engaged in the act of swimming (if there are any), 
would not exhibit the same attributes. A single process of 
swimming, though, occurs at different locations, different 
times, and involves different body parts. (It would be odd to 
say that swimming stops each time a change occurs.) 
Instead, we should account for these changes by allowing the 
process of swimming to take on different temporal and 
spatial parts. The likepartedness relation captures this feature 
of a process by allowing some of its parts to no longer be 
part of the process while others begin being part of the same 
process.  
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Another benefit of adopting the likepartedeness relation as 
the accurate description of the relationship between a 
process and its parts is that this adoption prevents everything 
from becoming part of a process. The reason becomes clear 
if we first consider what would happen if we adopted strict 
likepartedness. If all of a processes’ parts are of the same 
kind as the process, then an activity such as swimming 
would require that every part involved in swimming at 
anytime would be involved in the act of swimming—even 
when swimming was no longer occurring! This would lead 
to the strange outcome that all the water in a pool that had 
served as the medium through which the swimmer swam 
would still be part of the swimming process, even when the 
swimmer had left the pool. The likepartedness relation, on 
the other hand, is closer to our observations and our 
intuitions. We see things become part of a process and no 
longer belong to a process, even if the process is still 
occurring.  
 
Because the likepartedness relation prevents everything 
from becoming part of a process, we are able to identify 
when the process recurs. In other words, we can recognize 
distinct instances of the process, which allows us to identify 
the process as an individual. This allows us to count 
recurrences as well as identify the nature of the process and 
its relationship to its parts. Most importantly for the purposes 
of this essay are our abilities to recognize the dependence 
relations of a process, and to understand how these 
dependence relations can be asymmetrical.  
 
Many processes depend upon other processes. (I have 
difficulties imagining a process that does not depend upon 
another process.) In particular, the act of swimming depends 
upon an environment that allows for swimming to occur, 
a body that can swim, a medium through which the body 
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can swim, and a container for that medium. Water is 
itself a process that is identified in terms of an 
arrangement of molecules that endures over time. The 
human body is a collection of biological processes 
working collectively to allow the body to move in a 
particular way. The container of water is itself 
comprised of other atoms and molecules that are 
arranged in such a way as to not allow water to pass 
through its barrier. None of which is a static entity, as 
the substance ontologist would have it; all of these 
processes must maintain their arrangements over time 
for the swimming activity to be successful. 
 
Even though swimming is dependent upon other 
processes, the process of swimming does not appear to 
be symmetrical. We can still imagine a swimming pool 
without any swimmers, and we can imagine the 
container without any water in it. So the process of 
swimming is an asymmetrical process: take away the 
swimming, and the pool will still exist, but take away 
the pool and no swimming can occur.  
 
Let us take stock of what has been done so far. By 
shifting from a substance-based ontology to a process-
based one, we can provide an account of processes as 
being activities that occur in a particular mode. 
Specifically, we have seen that some processes occur 
over time and that they are asymmetrically dependent. I 
believe that the cognitive system is a similar process to 
the one of swimming that I have discussed above. To 
highlight this similarity, I will briefly discuss how the 
cognitive system exhibits similar characteristics to 
swimming when thought of as a process rather than as a 
substance. 
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4.2. COGNITION AS PROCESS 
 
Cognitive activity is something that occurs over time—it 
begins and ends. Like swimming, cognitive activity fulfills 
the same conditions given above for something being a 
process. For example, thinking is something that is always 
completed once it has begun; we can say that a thought has 
occurred once a person begins to think. Thoughts can begin 
and end. It is possible for us to have the same thoughts at 
different times, and the present occurrence of thinking is an 
outcome of previous thinking having occurred.  
 
The likepartedness relationship also provides us with a way 
of thinking about how the cognitive system depends upon its 
constituent parts. Not all of the parts of the cognitive system 
must be engaged during cognitive activity to be counted as 
part of the cognitive process. When we have a thought, it is 
not the case that every neuron must fire at once for a thought 
to occur (although it may at times feel like this happens). The 
brain could not handle this demand of its resources. So, 
although, not all the parts of the brain are engaged all the 
time, we still have good reasons for thinking that the brain, 
and the inactive parts of the brain are part of the cognitive 
system, just not in the same way at the same time.  
 
This likepartedness of the cognitive system further allows us 
to account for the change that occurs within cognitive 
activity. We have different memories, thoughts, desires, 
wishes, and dreams. We see different colors, have different 
tactile sensations, and hear different sounds. But none of 
these activities involve the brain in the same way. Instead, 
“The systems responsible for sensing the external world are 
composed of hierarchically organized, interacting neuronal 
groups” (Bloom et al. 2001, 140).  As in the case of taste, 
different parts of the cortex are activated when we 
experience different taste sensations. Sour and bitter tastes 
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activate the neurons in the same region, whereas sweet 
objects stimulate the neurons in the opposite region of the 
cortex (Bloom et al. 2001, 138). Although some neurons 
may be engaged all the time during cognitive activity, it is 
not the case that all of the neurons are engaged when 
cognitive activity occurs. The cognitive system can be said 
to take on different spatial parts at different times depending 
upon the cognitive activity that is being performed. This is 
similar to how different parts of the body are activated when 
a person is engaged in different activities. Running is an 
activity that occurs in a different environment from 
swimming and requires a different set of joints to move in a 
different way than swimming requires. 
 
We also see similar dependence relations arise between 
cognitive activity and swimming. The cognitive system is 
arguably a biological system, and a biological system is 
dependent upon an environment. The environment, within 
which the biological system is situated, is also a process. 
Similar to the process of swimming, we can remove a 
biological system from the environment without having the 
environment also disappear. On the other hand, if we remove 
the environment, the biological system will also disappear 
with it. By thinking more locally, we can imagine the 
biological body as the environment within which the 
cognitive system is situated. If the biological body ceases to 
exist (i.e., dies), then the cognitive process will also halt, but 
if we remove the cognitive system, the body will still be 
engaged in a biological process—namely, decomposition.  
 
This appears to be an obvious example as to how the 
cognitive system is an asymmetrically dependent process, 
but to make the point more explicit it may be helpful to think 
even more locally. The brain and CNS are both involved in 
cognitive activity in some way to such an extent that if either 
is damaged or removed, then the cognitive system is 
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modified or ceases to allow cognitive activity to take place. 
However, if the cognitive system ceases to exist, it is still 
possible for the brain and CNS to exist.  
 
It seems that what I have offered so far is an argument for 
intracranialism by showing how the cognitive system is 
asymmetrically dependent upon the brain and CNS. 
Remember, though, that we are working within a process 
framework. This means that the cognitive system is to be 
understood as a process. So even if the cognitive system is 
dependent upon the brain and CNS, it may not be the case 
that the cognitive system is bound by the brain and CNS. 
This is due to the cognitive system being dependent upon not 
only the internal components of the biological organism, but 
also the external environment. We do not want to say, 
because of the likepartedness relation, that the entire 
environment is itself part of the cognitive system, although 
there may be times at which a person’s cognitive activities 
are heavily dependent upon objects in the external 
environment in a way that those objects are themselves part 
of the person’s cognitive system.  
 
This is not to say that a person’s entire cognitive capabilities 
are dependent upon external objects, although there is no 
clear reason why this may not be the case, but it is likely that 
specific cognitive activities (e.g., remembering a building’s 
location) are dependent upon the external object (e.g., Otto’s 
notebook). This point illustrates how thinking is like 
swimming.  
 
The activity of swimming depends upon a medium external 
to the organism doing the swimming to such an extent that 
we are justified in believing that that medium is part of the 
swimming process. We, however, would not say that the 
medium is part of all physical activities that the person 
engages in (e.g., running). For similar reasons, we should not 
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suggest that the external object that is part of a specific 
cognitive activity is part of all cognitive activities that the 
cognitive system engages in—much in the same way that we 
should not suggest that the neurons involved in experiencing 
sweet objects are also part of the activity of tasting sour or 
bitter ones.  
 
4.3. RESPONSE TO CLARK’S FOMULATION 
 
At this point, it should be clear how this account of the 
cognitive system as an asymmetrically dependent process 
assists Clark in responding to his formulation of the 
asymmetry argument. Clark’s initial response was 
unsuccessful for two reasons. He doesn’t offer an actual 
description of the cognitive system that would allow for 
asymmetries to arise. Furthermore, he attempted to motivate 
the intuition that the cognitive system is asymmetrical by 
appealing to something of a different kind.  
 
I believe the description of the cognitive system I offer above 
as an asymmetrically dependent process assists Clark in 
overcoming these difficulties. In the first case, by showing 
how the cognitive system asymmetrically depends upon its 
own underlying processes, it becomes clearer how objects 
external to the organism can become part of the cognitive 
system without the cognitive system halting when those 
objects are no longer part of the system.  
 
Second, my account explains how some cognitive activities 
may be dependent upon external objects without requiring 
the entire cognitive system being dependent upon those 
external objects all the time. This is further illuminated by 
comparing the cognitive system (as a process) to swimming 
(something else that is a process). This motivates the 
intuition that some activities are dependent upon external 
objects to the extent that those objects are part of the system 
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engaged in that activity, since without the external object the 
system would not be able to successfully engage in the 
activity as such. This can be accomplished, though, without 
requiring the external object to be part of the system all the 
time.  
 
4.4. RESPONSE TO RUPERT’S FORMULATION 
 
Clark’s objection to Rupert’s formulation of the asymmetry 
argument, as I had reconstructed it, was unsuccessful for 
similar reasons to why it was unsuccessful in responding to 
Clark’s own formulation of the asymmetry argument. 
Because the analogy Clark provides does not explain how 
the cognitive system is asymmetrical, his analogy is unable 
to avoid the underdetermination problem that both the 
extended and embedded views encounter. Second, because 
the embedded account is able to account for the cognitive 
system’s dependency on the biological organism without 
requiring an explanation of how the cognitive system 
extends into the environment, using Rupert’s criterion for 
theory selection, we have more reasons to prefer the 
embedded perspective to the extended one.  
 
Although I do not believe my account definitively 
overcomes the first difficulty, I do believe that my account 
creates room for why we might prefer the extended view to 
the embedded account. The underdetermination problem 
arises because both the extended and embedded hypotheses 
are consistent with the current data available from cognitive 
science and psychology. In particular, if the removal of an 
external object leads to the alteration of a cognitive system, 
we are not able to determine if the cognitive system was 
altered because the external object was part of the cognitive 
system, or if it was altered because the cognitive system was 
only reliant upon the external object. I do not believe that my 
account can overcome this difficulty in its current form 
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because even when we think of a cognitive system as an 
asymmetrically dependent process, there is still the 
possibility that the object that was removed was only 
interacting with the cognitive system without being a part of 
it.  
 
My account of the cognitive system, however, does provide 
us with reasons for preferring the extended account to the 
embedded account. By maintaining that the cognitive system 
maintains likepartedness with its constituent parts, it can 
overcome difficulties of accounting for how the cognitive 
system can change as well as why some external objects are 
part of the cognitive system and others are not, and when 
external objects that were once part of the cognitive system 
are no longer part of it. The intracranialist, however, is not 
able to account for this change in cognitive activity by 
thinking of the cognitive system in purely substance terms. 
For the intracranialist, the cognitive system has its parts 
entirely. This would mean that the intracranialist would 
argue that the cognitive system maintains strict 
likepartedness for its dependency on its parts—that is, the 
parts of the cognitive system are themselves cognitive. This 
shifts the burden of proof to the intracranialist to explain why 
the cognitive system is bound by the brain and CNS all the 
time.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This essay has covered a lot of ground. After summarizing 
the asymmetry objection in both its formulations that Clark 
provides and the form that I believe is closest to Rupert’s 
intentions, I showed why Clark’s response unsuccessfully 
deals with both these formulations. I then went on to 
construct a formulation of the cognitive system that requires 
a shift from a substance-based ontology to a process-based 
one. This led us to understanding a cognitive system as an 
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asymmetrically dependent process. I then showed how this 
formulation of a cognitive system allows Clark to adequately 
respond to the asymmetry objection by overcoming the 
difficulties that I had originally found in his response. The 
downside of allowing four-dimensional entities into our 
ontology is that we also face difficult problems.ix I do not 
believe that these problems are any more difficult than the 
problems that face a substance-based ontology, although the 
reasons why require an independent discussion. 
 
The upshot is that my account of the cognitive system 
appears to be consistent with the extended mind thesis that 
Clark argues for. Processes are understood in terms of 
activities that extend over time. For example, we can 
recognize when someone has begun and has successfully 
completed swimming. Similarly, we can recognize when 
someone successfully performs a cognitive activity. We do 
this by making observations over time to identify how well 
a person engages and completes cognitive tasks. 
 
Furthermore, my account is consistent with the parity 
principle—a foundational principle for endorsing the 
extended mind theory. This principle suggests that: 
 
If as we confront a task, a part of the world 
functions as a process which were it done in 
the head, we would have no hesitation in 
recognizing as part of the cognitive process, 
then that part of the world is (so we claim) 
part of the cognitive process. (Clark and 
Chalmers 2010, 29; emphasis in original) 
 
By thinking of a cognitive system as an asymmetrically 
dependent process, the objects of the external world can at 
times play a significant role in determining the cognitive 
activities that the cognitive system can engage in. This 
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dependency does not appear to be any different than the 
firing of a neuron that takes place within the head. For this 
reason, if the neuron fires outside the head, and a cognitive 
activity is dependent on that neuron, it seems that we ought 
to still count that neuron as part of the cognitive system—
even if it is not within the skull. 
 
Lastly, there may be some cognitive activities that require 
the cognitive system be reliably coupled with an external 
object for the execution of those activities. By adopting an 
account of likepartedness, my account allows us to better 
understand how external objects can be part of a cognitive 
system without needing to be part of the cognitive system all 
the time—thereby showing how “thinking and cognizing 
may (at times) depend directly and noninstrumentally upon 
the ongoing work of the body and / or the extraorganisic 
environment” (Clark 2008, xxviii). 
 
 
 
NOTES
i I will be using ‘transcranialists’ and ‘extended mind theorists’ 
interchangeably. 
ii Although both Collins and Rupert put forward the asymmetry 
objection (Clark 2008, 162), I will be concerned with Rupert’s account 
for this paper.  
iii Although I believe that my account assists Clark in overcoming the 
asymmetry argument, I do not claim to resolve all the problems that 
Block (1978), Kim (1993), and Rupert (2009) address against the 
functionalist. 
iv This example makes way for a response to Adams and Aizawa’s 
account of what is wrong with Clark’s extended mind account: 
“Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4? Clark’s answer: 
Because it was coupled to the mathematician” (Adamas and Aizawa 
2010, 66). Clark responds to this “joke” in (Clark 2010).  
v An earlier account of this kind of functionalism can be found in 
Aristotle (Metaphysics Z, 1034ff).  
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vi It’s contentious what this balance is and what is particularly special 
about these epistemic virtues for theory selection.  
vii A substance can be understood as a material object “extended in 
three spatial dimensions and enduring in time without being extended 
in time” (Simons 1987, 117). 
viii This point raises the issue as to whether the Cheshire’s smile is in 
fact a smile once the body disappears. It seems that the smile only 
remains a smile by recalling the fading of the cat’s body, or imagining 
that the rows of teeth are attached to a face. 
ix Some of these problems are the modal problem for temporal parts, 
problem of identity, and puzzle of change. 
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